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Abstract 
This paper studies the determinants that have affected the solvency of Spanish credit institutions. Six hypotheses with data 
from the annual accounts of credit institutions that ranges from 2004 to 2011 are contrasted. Econometric panel data models 
are used. The results show that the dependence on wholesale financial markets, the NPLs and provisions for impairment, 
contribute negatively to the solvency. The increase in: portfolio of assets, real estate investments, leverage, staff costs and 
administrative and interest margin and other income, serve to strengthen solvency. 
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1. Introduction 
The reforms by the Spanish authorities and Basel III are 
aimed at strengthening the solvency of financial institutions. 
That is why we consider that solvency and its determinants 
are important for investigation. 
The aim of this work is to study the determinants of the 
solvency. The results could be used not only to predict future 
situations that may lead to a significant reduction in the 
solvency of Spanish credit institutions but also to try to avoid 
them. 
The methodology used in the research is econometric 
analysis with various regression models. The results indicate 
that real estate investments have not prejudiced solvency. The 
increase in leverage has improved solvency. However, the 
increase in finance from central banks and of the 
international financial markets has damaged solvency. 
Another important result is that banks that make greater 
efforts in investment in human resources gain greater 
solvency. 
The work contributes to the literature with an econometric 
model that can determine and predict which variables of 
annual accounts are determinant in the solvency for the 
period 2004-2011. The model will be used to manage 
financial assets and liabilities in order to achieve the 
objective of solvency marked in the Basel III rules. 
The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, in 
the second section, aims and hypotheses are presented. The 
third section presents the methodology used. The fourth 
proceeds to explain the results and the fifth presents the 
conclusions. 
2. Hypothesis 
Six hypotheses are contrasted in order to study the effect that 
each one has on solvency. 
All variables are constructed as a ratio in which the 
numerator is the variable described, and the denominator is 
the asset. 
1. Portfolio. Composed of non-credit investments. 
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An investment should produce benefits that contribute to 
increased solvency. However, when considering a period of 
crisis, losses may occur, and therefore the aforementioned 
investment may lower solvency. In respect to crisis periods in 
the portfolio, Rossignolo, Duygun and Shaban (2013) found 
that the solvency decreased as a result of the stock market 
crash of 2008. 
H1. Market developments have contributed to the decline in 
value of the investment portfolio of Spanish credit 
institutions. Therefore, a specific sign of regression model 
coefficients is not expected a priori. 
2. Risks estate. Real estate investments. 
According to Carbo and Maudos (2010) construction activity 
is responsible for the decrease in the solvency of Spanish 
credit institutions. 
H2. The large investment in real estate by Spanish credit 
institutions upon the bursting of the housing bubble has 
contributed to the decline in solvency. It is expected to have 
negative coefficients. 
3. Leverage. Ratio deposits - credit customers. 
There are two possible situations. i) By increasing credits it is 
expected that the risk will increase while solvency will 
decrease (Foos, Norden y Weber 2010). ii) Increasing 
leverage and maintaining equity, increases profitability and 
therefore solvency. 
H3. The growth based on increased leverage should 
strengthen the solvency. However, the increased leverage 
may decrease the level of risk. It is expected that the sign of 
this coefficient is undetermined.  
4. Dependence wholesale markets. Funding from central 
banks and wholesale markets. 
To increase funding for international wholesale markets 
should increase profits and solvency. However, after the close 
of these markets in 2008 those entities that were financed by 
these markets have experienced problems that have 
diminished solvency. 
H4. The increase in international funding in the wholesale 
markets has contributed to the decline in solvency. It is 
expected to have negative coefficients. 
5. NPLs. Provisions for insolvencies. 
The increase in unemployment and falling GDP increases 
NPLs, (Fernández de Lis et al, 2000; Brent et al 2011, 
Esteban y Estrada 2012) and this increase in NPLs has 
caused the decline in profits and solvency. 
H5. - The socioeconomic situation is one of the factors that 
have caused the increase in defaults and thus the increase in 
provisions, reducing the solvency. The expected sign of the 
coefficients of this indicator will be negative. 
6. Incomes and expenses. Returns on capital. Investee result. 
Administrative expenses. Commissions and interest margin. 
It is expected that credit institutions more efficient, will have 
a greater solvency. (Liua y Wilson 2010) Carbó y Maudos 
(2010) y Carbó, Márquez y Rodríguez (2012). 
H6. - the evolution of items of incomes and expenses you 
cannot predict a priori. The expected sign of the coefficients 
should be different in the accounts of incomes and the 
expenses. In the expenditure it will be negative and in the 
income it will be positive. 
3. Methodology 
The data used for the study are the financial statements and 
the Annual Report (of the companies included in the sample, 
from 2004 year of high growth, until 2011 practically 
completed financial restructuring. 
The dependent variable is called solvency and it is 
constructed as a ratio of equity in respect to assets. In the 
Standards based on Basel II the concept of “equity” is quite 
broad. Financing that is not equity, is included in the Tier I 
and Tier II. In addition, there have been many changes during 
the period studied. So, in order to standardize the data equity 
has been used, Shareholders' equity, as the numerator, 
especially given that one of the objectives of Basel III is to 
increase the quality of equity. 
To test the hypotheses we followed the methodology used by 
Tarus et al (2012) in the extension of the model of Ho (1981). 
The availability of information for a sample of 72 credit 
institutions and 8 time periods allows for the exploitation of 
the double dimension, temporal and cross section, through an 
econometric model of unbalanced panel data. 
Regression is performed by means of an ordinary least square 
model, OLS with fixed effects and generalized least squares 
for the model with random effects. After studying the 
regressions and performing the homogeneity test and the 
Hausman test, the model with higher quality is the one which 
is done with fixed effects. Therefore, it is considered that 
there are specific characteristics of each entity, constant over 
time, but not measurable or observable, that could affect this 
relationship, αi, so the fixed effects model is specified: 
Solvency = ∝i + ∑βx varit+ ωit 
"varit" are the variables that configure the indicators 
described in the previous section. 
Some of the variables could be expected to have indirect 
effects on each other, which would entail a problem of 
multicollinearity. To evaluate this potential problem between 
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the variables were calculated the correlations verifying that 
there are no problems of this nature. In addition, the Variance 
Inflation Factor has also been obtained and it has been 
confirmed that there is no multicollinearity problem, see 
column 4 and 8 of Table 2. 
All models have been estimated by the estimator of robust 
standard errors heteroskedasticity consistent. As a result of 
data, the statistical Durwin-Watson, it is possible that there is 
autocorrelation of the first order in the residues. To correct 
this situation, two new regressions have been estimated, one 
with MCO including the dependent variable with an delay of 
a year and another by Arellano and Bond’s general method of 
moments (GMM). 
For the estimation of the models the EViews econometric 
program in its version 7 is used. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Results 
In Table 1 the descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the model are shown. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables. 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Ob. 
Equity 0.0605 0.0573 0.1670 -0.1321 0.0247 425 
Assets portfolio 0.0475 0.0286 0.2631 0.0000 0.0482 425 
Short-term debt portfolio 0.0747 0.0679 0.3015 0.0000 0.0485 425 
Portfolio short-term shares 0.0267 0.0192 0.1811 0.0001 0.0270 425 
Investment Property 0.0099 0.0053 0.0803 0.0000 0.0119 425 
Real estate adjudications 0.0044 0.0005 0.0552 -0.0275 0.0082 425 
Leverage 1.1562 1.0570 2.9770 0.7473 0.3222 425 
Central bank financing 0.0222 0.0075 0.2576 0.0000 0.0329 425 
Negotiable debits 0.1226 0.1014 0.7205 0.0000 0.0990 425 
Subordinated liabilities 0.0228 0.0222 0.4327 0.0000 0.0238 425 
Provisions for bad debts 0.0058 0.0039 0.1817 -0.0026 0.0101 425 
Capital returns 0.0009 0.0005 0.0121 0.0000 0.0011 425 
Investee result 0.0008 0.0001 0.0363 -0.0050 0.0041 425 
Administrative expenses 0.0130 0.0124 0.0245 0.0004 0.0037 425 
Commissions s 0.0048 0.0046 0.0151 -0.0031 0.0020 425 
Interest margin 0.0166 0.0159 0.0309 -0.0147 0.0050 425 
 
4.2. Econometric Results 
The results indicate that all three models have a significant 
level of prediction / explanation for the determinants of 
solvency, because the adjusted R
2
 is 0.89. See Table 2. This 
could also lead us to believe that there is a problem of over-
parameterization and noise being modeled in the data. To 
dispel this doubt and following the philosophy of machine 
learning (Bishop, 2006) the sample was randomly divided 
into two sets, one of modeling (learning group), with 80% of 
the observations, and another the evaluation (test group), 
with the remaining 20%. The test results showed an excellent 
predictive ability of the model; consistent with the observed 
in the R
2
. 
In all three models the signs remain constant, and the 
coefficients have very similar values, indicating that the 
models are consistent and robust. 
Of the three, the MGM Arellano and Bond model gets 
statistically better significance in the variables and has no 
problems of correlation between the residuals. That is why 
this is the main model that we use for discussion of the 
results. 
The results of the hypotheses to be tested are: 
H-1. Portfolio. In examining the coefficients of the three 
variables, we found that despite the crisis the increase in 
portfolio investment contributes to increased solvency. 
Therefore we can say that the impact of the crisis has not 
affected the portfolio of credit institutions, contributing to 
increased solvency 
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Table 2. Econometric model. 
 Variables 
OLS with fixed 
effects 
VIF 
OLS fixed effects 
with a delay 
GMM Arellano 
Bond 
Elasticity VIF 
 C  
0.037*** 
 
0.016* 
   (0.008) 
 
-0,009 
Dependent variable 
with a delay 
Equity previous year   
0.493*** 0.133*** 
 5.389 
  
(0.009) (0.045) 
 
Portfolio 
Assets portfolio 
0.022 
2.012 
0.011 0.019* 
0.015 4.388 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.010) 
Short-term debt portfolio 
0.014 
2.287 
0.009 0.020*** 
0.025 5.651 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.007) 
Portfolio short-term shares 
-0.067 
1.626 
-0.061 -0.013 
-0.006 2.655 
(0.049) (0.057 (0.017) 
Real estate risks 
Investment Property 
0.014 
1.541 
0.049 0.051* 
0.08 2.596 
(0.063) (0.045) (0.028) 
Real estate adjudications 
0.098 
1.697 
0.109 0.081** 
0.006 2.567 
(0.078) (0.087) (0.039) 
Leverage Leverage 
0.010*** 
2.637 
0.010** 0.008*** 
0.154 4.622 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Dependence on 
wholesale markets 
Central bank financing 
-0.056*** 
2.379 
-0.048** -0.039*** 
-0.014 3.374 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.009) 
Negotiable debits 
-0.025*** 
2.722 
-0.017 -0.019*** 
-0.039 2.468 
(0.013) (0.016) (0.006) 
Subordinated liabilities 
-0.198*** 
1654 
-0.061 -0.081** 
-0.031 4.310 
(0.072) (0.084) (0.040) 
NPls Provisions for bad debts 
-0.683** 
3.314 
-0.509* -0.420*** 
-0.040 7.156 
(0.265) (0.294) (0.095) 
Income and 
expenses 
Capital returns 
1.190 
1.221 
0.904 1.177*** 
0.017 3.705 
(0.912) (1.102) (0.367) 
Investee result 
-1.046** 
1.352 
-0.506* -0.0989*** 
-0.013 1.565 
(0.0432) (0.257) (0.154) 
Administrative expenses 
2.052*** 
3.846 
0.677 1.302*** 
0.280 5.484 
(0.389) (0.814 (0.271) 
Commissions s 
-2.653*** 
2.866 
-1.976 0.037 
0.003 2.121 
(0.765) (1.26) (0.349) 
Interest margin 
0.578** 
2.180 
0.558** 0.649*** 
0.178 2.386 
(0.0226) (0.275) (0.077) 
 R2 adjusted = 0,892 
 
0,894 33,37238 J-statistic 
 
 Durbin-Watson 1,196 
 
1,721 
   
 
H-2. Real estate risks. The sign of the coefficients of the two 
variables that form it, investment property has been positive 
and statistically significant in the GMM model. That fact is 
consistent with the findings and opinions of the majority of 
authors of literature, because the credit institutions did not 
update the value of investments at market value. Here it is 
important to keep in mind that in 2012, a period that is not 
included in the sample, regulations were published in order to 
update the market price of the assets that were in balance 
Spanish credit institutions. 
H-3. -Leverage. The sign of the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant. Therefore, an increase in leverage 
contributes to increased solvency. In this case elasticity is 
0.154, so, for every 1% increase in leverage, solvency 
increments by 0.154%. The first of the theories presented in 
the framework is fulfilled. The effect of the increased risk 
assumed by increasing solvency is less than the increase of 
income earned. 
H-4. Dependence on wholesale markets. The increase of the 
three variables that constitute the indicator contributes to 
reducing solvency. The three variables have a negative sign 
and are statistically significant. 
H-5. -NPls. It also meets expectations, since the provisions 
have the negative coefficient with a significance level of 1%. 
Therefore, the socio-economic environment has caused an 
increase in defaults and contributed to the decrease in 
solvency. 
H-6. Income and expenses. Income returns to capital and 
margin are significant and with the expected positive sign, 
more income, and more solvent. However, income from 
investee companies is negative and significant in all models. 
The commissions are not statistically significant. Overall the 
most interesting fact is the positive sign of the coefficient of 
the variable administrative expenses. This result means that 
greater spending on personnel increases solvency, with an 
elasticity of 0.280. This result coincides with the 
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investigations of Claessens et al, 2001; Abreu y Mendes, 
2003; Carbó y Rodríguez, 2007 y María y Agoraki 2010, and 
Climent y Pavía (2015). 
Finally, the dependent variable with a delay included in the 
GMM has significant result with a coefficient of 0.133, so a 
certain inertia is observed in the model. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has studied the potential determinants of solvency 
through the construction of econometric models 
The results indicate that: 1) The increase in funding from 
wholesale markets, central banks and subordinated doubt 
decreases solvency. 2) The increase in defaults and therefore 
the provisions caused by socio-economic situation also 
decreases solvency. 3) The increase of current revenues 
strengthens solvency. Likewise investment in human 
resources increases the solvency. 4) Investment in real estate 
assets does not decrease solvency. 5) Investment in financial 
assets does not reduce solvency. 6) Finally, the increase the 
leverage increases solvency. 
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